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A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE
PIAA† DATA SHARING PROJECT AND
THE NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA
BANK: POLICY, PURPOSE, AND
APPLICATION
*

LAWRENCE E. SMARR
I
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature and scope of the differences between the Data Sharing Project conducted by the Physician Insurers
Association of America (“PIAA”) and the National Practitioner Data Bank
(“NPDB”), which is operated by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services. These data collection and dissemination projects are similar in the
sense that they were both designed to capture codified information regarding
medical malpractice claims. However, they are very different in their purposes
and in the nature of the data captured.
The NPDB was originally developed to help identify “problem practitioners” on a national basis. This purpose differs greatly from the purpose of the
PIAA Data Sharing Project, which was designed to provide clinical loss prevention data for use in physician education programs. Indicative of the wide difference between the two systems, of the seventy-six data fields found in these
two data bases, only seven are common to both.
The PIAA Data Sharing Project is utilized extensively by the insurance
company members of the Association and others to provide evidence of the
medical conditions, procedures, and practices that give rise to medical malpractice claims. It relies on a complex code system incorporating the International
Classification of Diseases, 9th. Clinical Modification (ICD-9), to identify medical conditions and treatments, and on other systems of specialized codes to account for medico-legal issues. Importantly, it does not identify individual practitioners.
In addition to medical malpractice payment data, the NPDB captures information regarding hospital privilege restrictions and revocations, licensure,
and other disciplinary actions taken by regulatory authorities. The NPDB collectively refers to these as “adverse actions.” Adverse actions encompass only
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18.6% of the records reported to the NPDB, and these incidents are not captured by the PIAA.1 Consequently, this paper will focus only on the comparison of malpractice claims data collection efforts.
The NPDB data was designed to meet the original purpose of the Data
Bank—to identify individual practitioners. Only one data field, a generic act or
omission code (two per record), permits the capture of information regarding
the substance of the malpractice claim. Therefore, the NPDB is ill suited for
research regarding the nature of malpractice claims and industry trends.
Despite this unsuitability, the NPDB has embarked upon a research agenda,
which includes drawing conclusions regarding the incidence of claims and substantive research into the underlying causes or extent of medical malpractice.
In addition to the unsuitability of the data captured by the NPDB for these
purposes, the existing data has a number of definitional shortcomings that affect analytical accuracy:
(1) The NPDB payment data field captures the value of the first
payment made on a claim, but subsequent payments are not reported.
While this serves as an indication that a payment has been made, it
does not provide an accurate measure of the amount of the total indemnity paid on any claim.
(2) The NPDB does not have the resources to verify the accuracy of
the information reported to it, and acknowledges that it suffers from a
“lack of clarity, context, and consistency.”
(3) The NPDB lacks a unique identifier for each individual practitioner, making precise identification difficult and making it impossible to
link together payments made by multiple insurance carriers for the
same incident.
(4) The act or omission codes collected by the NPDB are so general
in nature and duplicative that any conclusion drawn from them cannot
be relied upon.
(5) In many instances, the NPDB cannot provide reliable information
regarding individual culpability in multiple defendant cases, where the
actual amount paid is reported on behalf of each individual is unknown. The NPDB requires that the total amount paid on behalf of
all defendants be reported for each defendant. This affects the calculation of even the most basic statistics, such as mean and median payment values.
(6) Financial payments to patients are not necessarily indicative of
physician negligence—a fact recognized in the authorizing legislation
of the NPDB. The NPDB, however, lacks any peer review of the ac1. See NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK 1996
ANNUAL REPORT (1997) [hereinafter NPDB ANNUAL REPORT] .
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tions reported to it, which would help to identify the payments indicative of negligence. Also, the NPDB attempts to do state-by-state
comparisons that ignore local differences in the way legal systems
handle malpractice actions, as well as distinct insurance requirements
and demographic variations.
The NPDB and PIAA data bases were designed for different purposes.
While current efforts to use the NPDB data for research into malpractice insurance trends suggest a substantive component to the NPDB data, a closer
look reveals these efforts to be fruitless.
II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Rise of Physician-Owned or -Controlled Physician Insurers
Prior to the malpractice insurance availability crisis of the mid-1970s, the
standard commercial market provided most medical malpractice insurance
coverage for individual practitioners and institutions. As it was then a small
line of business, these insurers made little effort to collect the data necessary
beyond basic financial statistics to understand the nature of medical malpractice claims. When the 1970s crisis hit, the insurers suddenly recognized that this
minor line of insurance was causing a major hemorrhage of their reserves.
Rather than attempt to learn more about medical malpractice issues and determine the causes of the losses, most of the commercial carriers exited the
market. Health care providers, who had already experienced skyrocketing insurance premiums, were faced with an even more onerous problem—the
threatened unavailability of insurance coverage at any price.
The medical professions responded to this crisis by forming a providerowned segment of the malpractice insurance industry. As the major carriers
left the market, state and local medical associations formed their own carriers
ready to assume the commercial carriers’ former business. Today, more than
fifty physician-owned or controlled companies provide the majority of medical
professional liability insurance coverage in the United States. In addition to
providing insurance, these new companies were committed to collecting the
data necessary to permit adequate forecasting of loss trends, as well as identifying the legal and clinical causes for medical accidents and claims.
B. Regulatory Attention
In response to growing concern over the malpractice issue, in 1975 the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) commissioned the
first comprehensive medical malpractice data collection effort in.2 This threeyear study required the mandatory reporting of data on all settled claims, and
2. See NAT’L ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, 2 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
CLOSED CLAIMS, 1975-1978 (M. Patricia Sokwa, ed. 1980).
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resulted in the production of the first national medical malpractice claims data.
However, this study was conducted only once, and ended in 1978. Moreover,
such early data collection systems did not produce much relevant loss prevention information. Recognizing the value of compiling nationwide comprehensive malpractice loss statistics on an ongoing basis, in 1985 the PIAA implemented a standardized format for the collection of detailed data.3 This project
has grown to contain information on more than 160,000 medical malpractice
claims and legal actions. The PIAA program sought to build upon the pioneering efforts of the NAIC study, and was expanded in scope to produce output usable by the PIAA member companies in their risk management efforts.
C. Formation of the National Practitioner Data Bank
Public interest in the medical malpractice problem prompted Congress to
enact the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, which created the
NPDB.4 This Act sought to improve the quality of health care by encouraging
medical professionals to identify and discipline practitioners who engage in unprofessional behavior, and to restrict the ability of health care professionals to
move from locale to locale without disclosure of his or her adverse performance record.5 The first payment made in settlement of any malpractice action
triggers a report to the NPDB.6 Subsequent payments on the same claim are
not required to be reported to the Data Bank.7
The architects of the NPDB legislation directed that data be reported to
allow the identification of possible problem practitioners.8 Hospitals and other
health care entities would then use this data along with other evaluative and
credentialing information already in existence.9 The information collected was
not designed as a definitive measure of the quality of a practitioner’s performance, nor for use in measuring or analyzing the nature or trends in medical
malpractice claims data.
The role of the NPDB, as described in its 1996 Annual Report, is to be a
central repository of the following: (1) medical malpractice payment information; (2) licensure actions taken against physicians and dentists; (3) mandatory
professional review actions taken against physicians and dentists, and optional
reviews of other licensed practitioners; and (4) actions taken against medical
professionals by the Drug Enforcement Agency.10 The data is intended to alert
health care entities, licensing authorities, and professional societies that they

3. PHYSICIAN INSURERS ASS’N OF AM., DATA SHARING PROJECT REFERENCE MANUAL (1995)
[hereinafter PIAA REFERENCE MANUAL].
4. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101 - 11152 (1997).
5. See NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, NPDB GUIDEBOOK A-2 (1994) [hereinafter
NPDB GUIDEBOOK].
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See 42 U.S.C. §11131 (1997).
9. See id. §11135.
10. See NPDB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
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may need to undertake further review of a practitioner’s background.11 The information is intended to augment and verify, not replace, other sources of information, including reports from entities such as state licensing boards, medical malpractice insurers, and prior employers.12 The NPDB was not designed to
provide all details of reported incidents or actions.13
The original legislation never contemplated that this information would be
made public (in other than aggregate statistical form) or used for unrelated research purposes.14 The system was not designed with the detail needed to investigate meaningful comparative trends.15 Necessary information is missing: such
as the physician’s medical specialty, nature of the illness of the patient, diagnoses, medical procedures performed, and other similar data describing the medical treatment from which the malpractice action arose. In addition, strict confidentiality provisions were included in the regulations implementing the
legislation, requiring that information reported to the NPDB not be disclosed
outside the Department of Health and Human Services except to qualified querying entities, such as hospitals and other health care organizations conducting
clinical peer review.16 Violators of the confidentiality provisions are subject to
civil penalties of up to $10,000.17
D. The Development of the PIAA Data Sharing Project
The Physician Insurers Association of America (“PIAA”) is a non profit
trade association, founded in 1977 to represent the interests of U.S.-based physician-owned or controlled professional liability insurance carriers. While its
initial members were all providers of medical malpractice insurance which dealt
primarily with physicians, membership has been expanded to include dental insurance carriers and insurers operating outside the United States. The current
membership consists of forty-five domestic physician insurers, three domestic
dental insurers, six foreign physician insurers, and six reinsurers. The fortyeight primary domestic carriers insure over 250,000 physicians and dentists.
One of the founding purposes of the PIAA was to exchange information regarding malpractice insurance industry trends and operations. Each member
insurance company collected loss data for its own use. It was apparent, however, that an individual company’s volume of claims was inadequate to accurately evaluate claims trends. For example, a carrier might expect to incur only
a few claims for the failure to diagnose or treat a fracture of the femur in any
year—too few from which to draw any conclusions regarding the nature of this
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See 42 U.S.C. §11137 (b)(1) (1997).
15. See Elements Under Consideration for Expanding the Research Capacity of the National
Practitioner Data Bank, 56 Fed. Reg. 8784 (proposed Mar. 1, 1991) [hereinafter EXPANDING NPDB
RESEARCH CAPACITY].
16. See 45 C.F.R. § 60.13 (1997).
17. 42 U.S.C. §11137(b)(2) (1997).
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claim type.
Thus, the concept of sharing and aggregating such information resulted in
the formation of the PIAA Data Sharing Project. Twenty-four of the PIAA
member carriers participate in the Project, which began operation in 1985.18
While only PIAA member insurance carriers may report data to the Project,
analytical output from the database is provided to any inquiring entity.
The detailed data reported to the PIAA includes information regarding
claims filed only against physicians, dentists, and other health care providers.19
Ninety-eight percent of the claims reported are filed against physicians. No information regarding the population of physicians from which the claims resulted is reported, which makes it impossible to determine the incidence of
claims against any population of physicians. Some view this as a shortcoming.
However, collecting underwriting information would allow the PIAA data
manager to approximate insurance rates and otherwise evaluate the performance of the carriers reporting the data. This would not only create significant
antitrust issues for the Association, but would discourage PIAA members from
reporting because of competitive concerns.20 Confidentiality concerns are the
major reason only about half of the eligible PIAA members participate. The
other reasons include cost and incompatibility with existing data systems.
III
A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE PIAA AND NPDB DATABASES
A. Overview of Differing Purposes
The PIAA Data Sharing System continues to track adverse medical outcomes and financial trends for medical malpractice claims, including pending
claims and those settled with or without an indemnity payment. This information has helped member companies establish loss prevention initiatives aimed
at those claims having a high frequency or severity. For example, many of the
PIAA member companies have utilized special reports and slide presentations
prepared by the PIAA regarding the failure to diagnose breast, colon and lung
cancer.
The NPDB captures information only on malpractice claims that result in a
settlement payment, which account for about thirty-two percent of all medical
malpractice claims resolved.21 The NPDB data set is composed of general information on the nature of the malpractice claims. It does not, however, cap18. See generally PIAA REFERENCE MANUAL , supra note 3.
19. See generally id.
20. Because of these antitrust issues, premium and rating information should be collected by a
disinterested party, such as the Insurance Services Office. While the PIAA could be viewed as a disinterested party, this does not prevent one of our members or a nonmember from alleging that we collected the data for price-fixing or other anti-competitive purposes. If the PIAA had premium data, it
would be able to calculate indicated future insurance premiums, and thus have highly desirable competitive information. This is a vulnerable place for a trade association to be.
21. See PHYSICIAN INSURERS ASS’N OF AM., PIAA DATA SHARING REPORTS 11 (1996).
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ture basic research demographics, such as the specialty of the physician. The
ability of the NPDB to track the adverse medical outcome of a claim is limited
to one field in the Data Bank that contains a code indicating a generic act or
omission on the part of the doctor that gave rise to the claim.
By definition, the NPDB and PIAA data bases are different in purpose, and
were designed to satisfy different requirements.22 The PIAA data base remains
in use for its original purpose of providing a comprehensive loss prevention resource of detailed medical malpractice claims data. However, the mission of
the NPDB has been expanded beyond its original purpose of identifying possible problem practitioners to include a research agenda aimed at evaluating
trends in medical malpractice claims experience.23
A side-by-side analysis is necessary to understand the differences in the
data captured in the PIAA and NPDB databases. While only seven of the data
elements are identical, some are similar. Forty-five fields are unique to the
PIAA repository, mostly capturing cause-of-loss, medico-legal, and demographic information.24 Twenty-four fields are unique to the NPDB, mainly involving the identification of the practitioner, identification of the reporting entity and payment information.
A comprehensive field-by-field analysis of the two repositories is undertaken in the Appendix A. The overlap of information between the two databases is minimal, with many of the common data elements being descriptive
and administrative in nature, such as the reporting entity’s identification number. The majority of the data in the PIAA Data Sharing Project is designed to
capture the nature of the medical malpractice incident, while the majority of
the data in the NPDB is designed to identify the practitioner involved in the
malpractice incident.
It is important to recognize that both of these data bases are now viewed by
their owners as credible sources of medical malpractice data for loss prevention
and research purposes. However, in the case of the NPDB, the design of the
data base and included data elements severely limit its application in this regard. This was recognized by the Division of Quality Assurance at the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services soon after the NPDB opened its
doors in 1990, when the Division published a notice of proposed rulemaking to
expand the NPDB to include additional data elements. The notice specifically
stated that “in order to increase the usefulness of the data Bank as a research
resource, the data currently collected from medical malpractice payors would
require expansion.”25 The pursuit of additional data elements was subsequently
22. See PIAA REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 3.
23. See NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING REPORT FOR THE DECEMBER 4, 1996 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
MEETING, JANUARY 6, 1997, PANEL DISCUSSION: USES OF DATA AND NEED FOR DATA 18-21 (1997).
24. Medico-legal information is information regarding legal issues which can be the primary cause
or a contributing factor in a malpractice claim. Examples include informed consent, assault, and abandonment.
25. EXPANDING NPDB RESEARCH CAPACITY, 56 Fed. Reg., supra note 15.
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dropped by the Department.
B. Performance and Analytical Considerations
1. The PIAA Data Sharing Project. The PIAA Data Sharing Project has
been in operation since 1985. More than 156,000 claims and suits have been
reported, which in most cases provides statistically significant data for
analytical purposes.26 The data have been used over the years by PIAA
member companies and others to support loss prevention programs, to measure
the cost of losses for certain medical procedures, and to assess financial trends
in medical malpractice indemnity and expense payments.
As previously noted, a perceived shortcoming that was designed into the
system from its inception is the lack of an exposure base (number of doctors) to
measure the incidence of claims for various demographic elements such as
medical specialty or for the performance of certain procedures. The individual
reporting insurance companies do have this information, and the PIAA provides special editions of the standard semi-annual reports to these companies
which contain only their reported data. Such disaggregation of an individual
insurer’s data allows the companies to compare their own experiences with the
national experience, and to compare their loss data to the population from
which the claims arose. Individual company experience is provided only to the
reporting company. Increasingly, PIAA members are expanding their markets
into multiple states, although many still principally underwrite in only one
state. For this reason, state-by-state comparisons are performed only with the
permission of the reporting companies.
Maintaining the accuracy of the reported data is an ongoing process. Many
of the critical data elements require codification utilizing ICD-9, which is a hierarchical codification system designed for 1) the classification of morbidity
and mortality information for statistical purposes; 2) the indexing of hospital
records by disease; and 3) operations for data storage and retrieval. Due to the
complexities of the ICD-9 codification system, persons knowledgeable and
trained in its use are required to perform the file coding. These individuals
must also have a working knowledge of the process of handling claims, and be
proficient in medical and legal terminology. The PIAA assists its member
companies in identifying the requirements for coding personnel, and conducts
structured coding classes for both new and experienced personnel. The PIAA
staff also makes site visits to the member companies to provide refresher
training and to deal with special problems or situations. Although with the
data system complications have been minimal throughout the life of the project, the PIAA also provides consultation in this area.
2. The National Practitioner Data Bank. The NPDB has been in operation

26. See PHYSICIAN INSURERS ASS’N OF AM., supra note 21.
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since September 1990.27 Although it had many data system problems in the
early years, it now appears to be performing its designed function at an
acceptable level.28 While the operational areas of the NPDB function properly,
the level of reporting accuracy relies on the diligence of those required to make
reports. The NPDB recognizes the necessity of achieving consistency among
those reports. While the large number of reporting entities makes individual
training virtually impossible, the NPDB publishes a guidebook and maintains a
toll-free number for training purposes.
However, difficulties still exist in the interpretation of the enabling legislation and in the nature of the information required to be reported. For example,
since the genesis of the NPDB, there has been confusion about the “corporate
shield” issue. The corporate shield refers to the situation where the medical
corporation for which the doctor works is named in the suit, and the doctor is
either not originally named or is released specifically for the purpose of avoiding a report to the NPDB. There is evidence that some insurers will “cut a
deal” with the plaintiff’s attorney to dismiss the doctor from the suit and let
the payment be made entirely on behalf of the corporation, hospital, or other
entity. These payments are often not reported to the NPDB, and a possibly
negligent doctor is never reported. Although some entities report these claims
in compliance with their interpretation of the NPDB requirements, NPDB officials acknowledge that “the number of malpractice-payment reports may have
been affected by the ‘corporate shield’ effect,” but the extent to which this occurs “cannot be conclusively measured by available data.”29 Based upon his
participation in a large number of malpractice cases, plaintiffs’ lawyer Jack H.
Olender estimates that this number may be as high as fifty percent.30
NPDB officials have acknowledged that “the value of the Data Bank is diminished by the lack of clarity, context, and consistency in reporting. In effect,
lack of uniformity in reporting limits the usefulness of the data.”31 Specifically,
different interpretations of the reporting requirements may result in incomplete or inaccurate reporting of a situation. This, in turn, may lead to misinterpretation of the results either when queried or conducting research.
Identifying the practitioners for whom information has been reported is the
core goal of the NPDB. However, the data system was designed without providing for a unique identifier for each individual practitioner, such as the practitioner’s Social Security number or the medical education number assigned to
27. See Robert E. Oshel et al., The National Practitioner Data Bank: The First 4 Years, 110 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 383, 385 (1995).
28. See DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DIV. OF QUALITY ASSURANCE, NATIONAL
PRACTITIONER DATA BANK: USER SATISFACTION WITH REPORTING AND QUERYING AND
USEFULNESS OF DISCLOSURE INFORMATION FOR DECISION MAKING, 1992-1994, at xi (1995)
[HEREINAFTER NPDB USER SATISFACTION].
29. Wayne J. Guglielmo, Are Doctors Evading The Malpractice Data Bank?, MED. ECON., May
28, 1996, at 53.
30. See id.
31. Stephen B. Permison et al., The NPDB Reflects on Issues of Reportability (visited Jan. 29,
1998) <http://www.usmedicine.com/npdb.html>.
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all physicians by the American Medical Association. To identify individuals
and link their collective experience, the NPDB relies on a combination of reported data elements that include the last name, first name, birth date, and
medical school of the practitioner. The social security number and the federal
Drug Enforcement Agency identification number are included in the data file,
but are optional fields. Thus, they are not reliable as identifiers.
Another essential element missing from the NPDB is the ability to account
for and aggregate multiple malpractice payments resulting from a single incident. There is no mechanism to assure that payments by multiple insurers or
multiple payments made by one insurer are not represented as multiple incidents. For example, in states where a patient compensation fund exists, a
medical malpractice carrier will typically pay the physician’s basic policy limit
of the verdict or settlement, with the remainder being paid by the compensation fund. There is no case identifier stored in the NPDB that permits the electronic matching of these multiple payments. The same is true for payments
made under commercial excess insurance policies, and in situations where multiple primary carriers make payments on behalf of the same practitioners.32
Thus, multiple payments made by multiple payors on behalf of the same practitioner for the same incident appear as separate incidents in the NPDB file. It is
critical that credentialing committees are able to recognize this situation when
hospitals are using this information to make decisions regarding the grant of
clinical privileges. Additionally, as a result of multiple reporting, NPDB statistics are likely to be erroneous when used to measure the number of claims reported and average payment size.
Querying entities are also not able to glean reliable information from the
NPDB regarding individual culpability in multiple defendant cases. Because
many malpractice actions involve multiple defendants, it is not uncommon for a
single payment to be made on behalf of several practitioners who treated a patient. It is not always possible to discern the extent of liability for each individual, especially in the situation where the claim is expeditiously settled before
extensive discovery or expert review. The NPDB provides a field on the reporting form for the amount of the first payment on any claim and the number
of practitioners for which that payment is made. In many multiple defendant
cases, it is impossible to judge the amount of liability, if any, that should be assessed to each practitioner for whom an individual report will be filed. There
are also no means for NPDB reports to link together the individual practitioners involved in the incident.
3. Other Problems That Hinder Fair and Complete Reporting to the NPDB.
Monetary settlements to patients are often not indicative of negligent
treatment by a physician. Settlements are often made when it is more cost32. Typically, a medical malpractice insurance policy covers a physician for any payment not to
exceed the “primary limit,” which is usually $1,000,000 for any incident. A “commercial excess insurance policy” increases a physician’s coverage beyond this primary limit. This coverage is normally sold
in multiples of $1 million, up to $10 million.
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effective for the insurer to pay a small amount of indemnity rather than to incur
the costs of litigation to defend the claim. NPDB officials have stated that
“since the Data Bank serves only as a flagging system, the mere existence of a
report in the Data Bank should not be taken by professional reviewers to mean
that a practitioner has performed incompetently.”33 For example, it is not
uncommon for anesthesiologists or certified registered nurse anesthetists to
dislodge a tooth or filling during intubation or extubation. This is often caused
by the poor condition of the patient’s dentitia, and can result in a small
settlement to compensate the patient for damage or replacement, which must
be reported to the NPDB.
A related problem with monetary settlements is that there are a number of
malpractice insurance policies that do not require the practitioner’s consent to
settle a malpractice claim. It is not uncommon for an insurer to settle with the
patient in order to avoid increased costs as a result of a lengthy discovery and
negotiation period. Therefore, it is possible for an insurer to make a payment
on behalf of a physician without allowing him or her to provide input to the insurer regarding the circumstances surrounding the alleged incident. Such practices do not take into account the quality of medical care, as the decision to settle was purely economic. Nonetheless, the payments must be reported to the
NPDB and are available to querying entities.
The authors of the NPDB legislation acknowledge this economic impetus to
settlements. The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 states that “a
payment in settlement of a medical malpractice action or claim shall not be
construed as creating a presumption that medical malpractice has occurred.”34
A focus group on reportability conducted by the Health and Human Services
Division of Quality Assurance found that, given the absence of peer review of
the actions reported to the NPDB, it is impossible to determine which malpractice payments reflect a practitioner’s level of incompetence.35 The focus group
found that claims paid due to expediency should be differentiated from those
paid because of actual fault.36 NPDB reports are not clear whether a malpractice payment does or does not correspond to medical competence.37 Rather, the
querying entity is left to make that judgment, potentially at the expense of the
practitioner. This is supported by the NPDB Guidebook, which states that “a
payment made in settlement of a medical malpractice action or claim shall not
be construed as a presumption that medical malpractice has occurred.”38
The conclusion that data resulting from claims based on negligence should
be distinguished from other claims is further supported by a study published in
the New England Journal of Medicine, which indicates that only 23.8% of

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Oshel, supra note 27.
42 U.S.C. §11137(d).
See generally Permison et al, supra note 31.
Id.
Id.
NPDB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 5.
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claims closed with an indemnity payment were a result of negligent treatment.39
Ironically, the paid claims resulting from negligence had indemnity payment
values thirty-two percent less than the paid claims that did not result from negligence.40 The major conclusion of this study was that “the severity of the patient’s disability, not the occurrence of an adverse event or an adverse event
due to negligence, was predictive of payment to the plaintiff.”41
From an evaluative standpoint, perhaps the biggest shortcoming of the
NPDB data set is its inability to identify a physician’s specialty. Therefore, no
distinction is given to specialty groups with a higher expected frequency or severity of paid malpractice claims. In order to identify the real outliers, a querying entity should have the benefit of comparative specialty data when reviewing the payment reports.
4. NPDB Limitations That Affect Research. NPDB officials assert that
their data can be used to describe almost all malpractice payments made on
behalf of practitioners in the nation.42 They claim that state legislators can use
this data to compare the pattern of malpractice payments in their state with
neighboring states.43 However, NPDB officials fail to account for the state-tostate differences in the legal systems handling malpractice actions, as well as
distinct insurance requirements and demographic variations.
The NPDB is plagued by data definition problems and missing data elements which seem to be essential. Despite this, the NPDB staff contends that
the malpractice payment data has advantages for analytical research into industry values and trends.44 NPDB officials assert that their repository is the only
comprehensive national malpractice payment data set.45 With about 125,000
malpractice payments to date, it will grow over time to be the largest data base.
However, its inherent limitations, such as the lack of physician, patient, and
treatment demographics and incomplete payment data do not allow for fair
comparative analyses. Unfortunately, these issues are not easy to resolve, and
the collection of more appropriate research data would require redesigning the
data base and making a completely new collection effort.
In addition, NPDB officials report “because of their uniquely comprehensive nature, the Data Bank malpractice payment data are also attractive for
use, albeit with caution, in studies assessing the underlying extent of medical
malpractice incompetence.”46 This is in sharp contrast to the original Act’s acknowledgment that the existence of a malpractice payment does not necessarily

39. Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the Outcomes of
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1963 (1996).
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See Oshel, supra note 27.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. Id.
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mean that malpractice has occurred.47 However, NPDB officials believe that
the validity of assumptions necessary to make the connection between payments and incompetency would be fruitful subjects for further research.48 This
view represents a significant departure from the NPDB’s original purpose.
Given the questionable quality of the limited data available, the extent to
which payment data may be indicative of physician performance should be an
issue of grave concern for the medical profession.
5. Problems the NPDB Has Caused for Practitioners. There is evidence
that the introduction of the NPDB reporting requirements have made
physicians much less willing to consent to settle claims.49 Seventy-six percent of
malpractice insurers queried by the Data Bank in 1994 reported that claims
resolution had been affected by NPDB reporting, with 83 percent of larger
insurers reporting that practitioners had become less willing to settle cases.50
The size of the malpractice payment was not a factor.51 For those practitioners
insured under policies which require their prior consent to settle a claim,
certainly a record in the NPDB is a consideration. Reporting requirements
have been especially influential deterrents to settlement in those instances in
which there was no departure from the standard of care but the risk of a large
trial verdict remains.
Health care practitioners feel they are being stigmatized when they are reported to the NPDB for any reason.52 Practitioners have expressed concern that
there is little distinction between various magnitudes of gravity for which a
practitioner may be reported.53 In other words, there is no measure but the size
of the malpractice payment, which has been demonstrated to be arbitrary, to
indicate the degree of incompetence. However, the frequency of malpractice
payments was determined by the NPDB to be a more important factor to querying entities than the size of the payment.54
In the past three federal legislative sessions, bills were introduced that
would allow public access to the information reported to the NPDB.55 Viewed
in the context of the original assurances of confidentiality made when the
NPDB was created, public access has the potential to hamper seriously the physician’s willingness to settle a claim and to cause physicians’ competency to be
questioned based on incomplete information. The fact that it takes almost five
years to make a malpractice insurance payment after the incident occurs guarantees that the NPDB will not provide timely information for its original pur-

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See 42 U.S.C. §11137(d).
See Oshel, supra note 27.
See NPDB USER SATISFACTION, supra note 28, at 28-29.
See id.
See id.
See Permison, supra note 31.
See id.
See NPDB USER SATISFACTION, supra note 28, at 28-29.
See S. 2004, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 4272, 103d Cong. (1994).
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pose—identifying practitioners who may have a competency problem.56
6. PIAA Data Sharing Information. The PIAA Data Sharing Project
collects data on a semi-annual basis from twenty-four participating companies.
A major difference between the PIAA Data Sharing System and the NPDB is
that the Data Sharing System includes claims closed with no indemnity
payment. This increases the number of closed claims reported by more than
200 percent, as seventy percent (in 1996) of all claims and suits are closed with
no indemnity payment.57 PIAA data show that the average claim with an
indemnity payment takes about fifty-nine months to resolve from the incident
date. Claims with no payment are resolved in an average of fifth-three months.
Lawsuits that have been open for one year are also reportable to the Data
Sharing System, and the average age of this information when reported is only
twenty-one months from the date of the incident.58 This allows for more
comprehensive analyses of claim trends and provides more current information
with regard to claims involving new or controversial procedures.
As previously noted, the PIAA database was created primarily as a loss
prevention tool. The data allow users to look at the conditions or procedures
for any major specialty group that most frequently result in an adverse outcome. In addition, information such as the degree of severity of the patient’s
injury is captured, which is helpful in looking at the events that result in the
most serious outcomes. Examples of output from the PIAA data base are provided in Appendix B.
IV
CONCLUSION
It is difficult and inappropriate to compare the NPDB and the PIAA Data
Sharing Project as similar data capture systems. Each system was designed for
a different purpose. The NPDB was specifically intended to identify individual
practitioners, while the PIAA Data Sharing Project was designed to capture industry trends, and does not contain any information that permits the identification of individual practitioners. While current efforts to use the NPDB data for
research into malpractice insurance trends suggest a substantive component to
the NPDB data, a closer look reveals these efforts to be fruitless.

56. See PHYSICIAN INSURERS ASS’N OF AM., PIAA DATA SHARING REPORT nos. 13 & 14 (1996).
57. See PHYSICIAN INSURERS ASS’N OF AM., PIAA DATA SHARING REPORT 11, supra note 21.
58. See PHYSICIAN INSURERS ASS’N OF AM., PIAA DATA SHARING REPORTS nos. 13 & 14, supra
note 56.
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APPENDIX A
PIAA DATA SHARING PROJECT—NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK
COMMONALITY OF DATA ELEMENTS
(Y = PRESENT IN DATA BASE; N = NOT PRESENT IN DATA BASE)
Description Of Data Element

PIAA

NPDB

Reporting Entity Identification

Y

Y

Reporting Entity ID Number

N

Y

Relationship Of Entity to Practitioner

N

Y

Type Of Report

N

Y

Incident Number (Case File Number)

Y

N

Insured Number (Claim File Number)

Y

N

Entity Name And Address
Insurance And Legal Information

Accident Date

Y

Y

Report Date

Y

N

Claim/Suit Date

Y

N

Close Date

Y

N

Payment Date

N

Y

Judgment Or Settlement Date

N

Y

Adjudicative Body Case Number

N

Y

Adjudicative Body Name

N

Y

Status (Open Or Closed File)

Y

N

Coverage Type (Claims Made Or Occurrence)

Y

N

Y

N

Plaintiff/Patient Information
Age
Gender

Y

N

Income

Y

N

Marital Status

Y

N

Collateral Source Payor

Y

N

Name

N

Y

Organization Name

N

Y

Practitioner Information

Work Address

N

Y

Home Address

N

Y

Country

N

Y

License Number

N

Y
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PIAA

NPDB

State Of Licensure

N

Y

Field Of Licensure

N

Y

Social Security Number

N

Y

Federal DEA Number

N

Y

Professional School Attended

N

Y

Year Of Graduation

N

Y

Hospital Affiliation, City, State

N

Y

Specialty

Y

N

Board Certification

Y

N

Board Eligibility

Y

N

Insurance Policy Limits

Y

N

Type of Practice (Solo, Corporate, etc.)

Y

N

Medical School Attended

Y

Y

Full/Part Time Practice

Y

N

Age/Birth Date Of Practitioner

Y

Y

Gender

Y

N

Location Within Institution
Type Of Institution

Y

N

Incident Location

Y

N

Type Of Hospital

Y

N

State Where Action Brought

Y

N

Y

N

Payment Data
Total Indemnity Paid For Practitioner
Narrative Description Of Payment(s)

N

Y

Amount Of Initial Individual Indemnity Payment

N

Y

Indication Of Single Or Multiple Payments

N

Y

Number Of Practitioners For Which Payment Was Made

N

Y

Loss Adjustment Expenses—Defense Counsel

Y

N

Loss Adjustment Expenses—Expert Witness

Y

N

Total Loss Adjustment Expenses

Y

N

Lump Sum/Structured Settlement

Y

N

Cause Of Loss Information
Narrative Description Of Act Or Omission

N

Y

Severity Of Injury Indicator

Y

N

Medical Condition

Y

N
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PIAA

NPDB

Misdiagnosis

Y

N

Care Rendered (Procedure Performed)

Y

N

Anesthesia Procedure

Y

N

Medical Misadventure

Y

Y

Treatment Delay/Not Performed

Y

N

Iatrogenic Injuries

Y

N

Medical Outcome

Y

N

Associated Legal Issues

Y

N

Associated Personnel

Y

N

Emergency Situation

Y

N

Treatment Length

Y

N

Disposition Code (Settlement, Judgment, etc.)

Y

Y

Disposition Time

Y

N

Review Panel Decision

Y

N

Arbitration Panel Decision

Y

N

Company Liability Decision

Y

N

Previous Claim Experience

Y

N

SUMMARY
Number Of Fields Both Databases Include

7

Number Of Fields Only PIAA Includes

45

Number Of Fields Only NPDB Includes

24
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APPENDIX B
EXAMPLES OF DATA TABULATED FROM PIAA DATA SHARING PROJECT
TABLE B1
CLOSED FILES
JAN. 1995 - JUNE 1997

# Files
Total Closed Files

% Closed

Total

Average

Files

Indemnity Paid

Per File

135,423

100.0

$ 6.5 Billion

$ 48,211

43,020

31.8

$6.28 Billion

$151,764

92,403

68.2

0

$0

Files Closed
With Indemnity
Files Closed
Without Indemnity
Method of Payment:

Lump Sum

39,760 (92.4%)

Structured Settlement

3,249( 7.6%)

TABLE B2
EXPENSE INFORMATION: ALL CLOSED CLAIMS
JAN. 1995 - JUNE 1997
# Files With

Total Expenses

Average Paid

Data Reported

Dollars Paid

Per File

ALAE – Defense Attorney

92,473

$1.35 Billion

$14,633

ALAE – Expert Witnesses

61,077

$182 Million

$ 2,978

ALAE – Other

100,829

$426 Million

$ 4,234

TOTAL ALAE

118,541

$1.96 Billion

$16,551

RATIO OF EXPENSE TO INDEMNITY: All Closed Claims: 30.1 cents expense per indemnity
dollar.
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TABLE B3
EXPENSE INFORMATION: CLOSED CLAIMS WITH INDEMNITY PAYMENT
JAN. 1995 - JUNE 1997

TOTAL ALAE

# Files With

Total Expenses

Average Paid

Data Reported

Dollars Paid

Per File

39,595

$936 Million

$23,644

RATIO OF EXPENSE TO INDEMNITY: Closed Claims with Indemnity Payment: 14.3 cents
expense per indemnity dollar.

TABLE B4
SPECIALTY GROUP: INTERNAL MEDICINE, NON-SURGICAL
CUMULATIVE ANALYSIS OF PROCEDURES PERFORMED
JAN. 1985 - DEC. 1994
Closed
Claims

Paid
Claims

% Paid/
Closed

Evaluation Or Consultation

5,754

1,313

22.82

189,470,745

144,304

Prescription Of Medication

2,275

808

35.52

96,657,558

119,626

General Physical Examination

917

217

29.55

45,407,918

167,557

Injections And Vaccinations

625

206

32.96

25,422,495

123,410

No Care Rendered

575

62

10.78

6,919,892

111,611

Functions

478

151

31.59

33,549,452

222,182

Miscellaneous Manual Exams
& Non-Operative Procedures

427

119

27.87

18,981,186

159,506

364

161

44.23

29,174,955

181,211

Of The Large Intestine

293

103

35.15

10,936,402

106,179

Cardiac Catheterization

140

37

26.43

7,191,406

194,362

Procedure Performed

Indemnity:
Total ($)

Indemnity:
Average ($)

Diagnostic Interview,

Diagnostic Procedures Inv.
Cardiac And Circulatory

Diagnostic Radiographic
Procedures, Exc. CAT Scans
Diagnostic Procedures
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TABLE B5
SPECIALTY GROUP: INTERNAL MEDICINE, NON-SURGICAL
CUMULATIVE ANALYSIS OF PATIENT CONDITION
JAN. 1985 - DEC. 1994

Patient Condition

Closed
Claims

Paid
Claims

% Paid/
Closed

Indemnity:
Total ($)

Indemnity:
Average ($)

Myocardial Infarction, Acute

617

225

36.5

44,670,027

198,533

Malignant Neoplasms Of The

466

166

35.6

29,580,025

178,193

294

121

41.2

21,387,248

176,754

Pulmonary Embolism

216

73

33.8

12,251,276

167,826

Diabetes

221

61

27.6

5,962,966

97,754

Renal Failure

212

36

17.0

6,705,616

186,267

Lung And Bronchus
Malignant Neoplasms Of The
Female Breast

Hypertension

182

47

25.8

6,515,053

138,618

Malignant Neoplasms Of The
Colon And Rectal Region

182

78

42.9

16,795,185

215,323

Pneumonia

178

52

29.2

7,087,913

136,306

Coronary Atherosclerosis

161

46

28.6

5,800,265

126,093

TABLE B6
SPECIALTY GROUP: INTERNAL MEDICINE NON-SURGICAL
DIAGNOSIS ERROR CLAIMS —MOST PREVALENT CLAIMS
JAN. 1985 - DEC. 1994

Total
Files

Closed
Files

Paid
Files

% Paid/
Closed

Indemnity
Paid ($)

Avg.
Per Paid
File ($)

4,710

3,842

1,383

36.00

225,612,873

163,133

308

259

116

44.79

20,794,198

179,260

Myocardial Infarction, Acute

244

193

95

49.22

20,338,997

214,095

Malignant Neoplasms Of
The Female Breast

182

148

76

51.35

14,874,441

195,716

Malignant Neoplasms Of
The Colon Or Rectal Region

108

91

49

53.85

11,081,044

226,144

99

76

40

52.63

11,073,549

276,839

Errors In Diagnosis
Most Prevalent Conditions
Malignant Neoplasms Of
The Bronchus and Lung

Malignant Neoplasms Of
The Rectum Or Anus
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TABLE B7
SPECIALTY GROUP STATISTICS
JAN. 1985 - JUNE 1997
# Files
Specialty Group
Anesthesiolgy

# Files

% Paid/

Closed

Paid

Closed

5,364

1,972

36.76

Indemnity

Avg. Per

Paid ($)

Paid File ($)

343,800,412

$174,341

Cardio Diseases-NS*

1,749

326

18.64

60,143,653

$184,490

Cardio & Thoracic Surgery

3,657

888

24.28

142,528,653

$160,505

Dentists

403

200

49.63

7,607,768

$38,039

Dermatology- NS

1,526

489

32.04

37,402,563

$76,488

Emergency Med.- NS

1,971

557

28.26

78,183,950

$140,366

Gastroenterology- NS

995

223

22.41

27,339,986

$122,601

General Surgery

15,023

5,437

36.19

771,031,575

$141,812

General & Family Practice- NS

15,775

5,860

37.15

700,356,675

$119,515
$113,953

Gynecology
Internal Medicine- NS
Neurology- NS
Neurosurgery
OB/GYN Surgery
Ophthalmology
Oral Surgery
Orthopedic Surgery

1,621

532

32.82

60,623,133

17,725

4,847

27.35

721,401,701

$148,835

1,900

383

20.16

80,626,171

$210,512

3,318

950

28.63

221,733,153

$233,403

19,249

7,030

36.52

1,501,245,591

$213,548

3,970

1,203

30.30

159,793,679

$132,829

39

13

33.33

438,583

$33,737

14,101

4,235

30.03

554,906,002

$131,029

Other Nonsurgical Specialties

1,128

258

22.87

31,399,602

$121,704

Otorhinolaryngology

2,205

714

32.38

107,494,071

$150,552

35

3

8.57

779,000

$259,667

Paraprofessional
Pathology- NS

916

287

31.33

58,482,250

$203,771

Pediatrics- NS

4,270

1,253

29.34

279,705,207

$223,228

Plastic Surgery

5,319

1,582

29.74

131,000,643

$82,807

Psychiatry- NS

1,393

320

22.97

45,034,915

$140,734

Radiation Therapy- NS

1,034

232

22.44

49,294,292

$212,475

Radiology- NS

7,214

2,152

29.83

263,561,563

$122,473

Resident/Intern
Urologic Surgery
TOTALS
* NS = “nonsurgical.”

109

36

33.03

1,957,182

$54,366

3,414

1,308

30.40

127,313,842

$122,653

135,423

43,020

31.80

6,565,185,815

$152,608

